Naval War College Review

Volume 7
Number 8 *October*

Article 2

1954

The Nature of War

George A. Lincoln
U.S. Army

SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE READER

The material contained herein is furnished to the individual addressee for his private information and education only. The frank remarks and personal opinions of many Naval War College guest lecturers are presented with the understanding that they will not be quoted; you are enjoined to respect their privacy. Under no circumstances will this material be republished or quoted publicly, as a whole or in part, without specific clearance in each instance with both the author and the Naval War College.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the service might receive some of the educational benefits of the resident students at the Naval War College. Distribution is in accordance with BUPERS Instruction 1552.5 of 23 June 1954. It must be kept in the possession of the subscriber, or other officers eligible for subscription, and should be destroyed by burning when no longer required.

The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author, and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department or of the Naval War College.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Issued Monthly
U. S. Naval War College
Newport, R. I.

THE NATURE OF WAR

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 1 September 1953 by
Colonel George A. Lincoln, U.S.A.

Introduction

Admiral Conolly, gentlemen of the Naval War College. It is a great honor to be invited to speak from this platform and to this group. The honor carries with it a sobering responsibility. A discussion of the nature of war before an audience of experienced professionals dedicated to the mission of national security is certainly a safer mission for a senior flag officer or a civilian than for a contemporary. I approach my mission with humility. There are few absolutes and many controversies within that mission. My method and direction this morning will be to locate targets and suggest ideas for further discussion.

This approach is open to the charge of being long on ideas and short on opinions. But we need a great deal of discussion and perhaps some controversy to throw light on the nature of war in the future and on what we ought to do about it in our professional positions.

Method of Attack on Subject

There is a choice between digging a post hole in a portion of this subject for the next 45 minutes or attempting to plow across about 40 acres of the field. I have interpreted your President's helpful suggestions to me as asking for the 40-acre attempt. His letter suggested I discuss the elements of warfare and explore the characteristics of modern war and their effect on modern society.

I have not interpreted this discussion as necessarily including an examination of the nature of armed force or the operational use thereof for several reasons. The most important reason to my

mind is that armed forces are means rather than ends and are now institutionalized in ways that may not be particularly helpful to considering the foundational nature of war in the future and its effects on modern society. It is possible that armies and even navies and air forces as we know them may even in our time be recognized as but showy things. But the welkin rings with the voices of articulate experts like General Bonner Fellers, who are mauling this aspect of the nature of war. The direction of my remarks is rather toward explorations which give guidance to the use of armed force as an instrument of policy to deter war and to further our country's interest. This aspect of the use of force is traditionally probably better understood by naval officers than by officers of other services. To interpolate a personal note, I was first forced to think about it intensively through my fortunate associations with Admiral Savy Cooke — from whom I learned a great deal.

As an important preliminary to any analysis of the elements of warfare and their effect on society, we need a discussion of the definition of war and a look at some of the lessons of history.

Definition of Terms

The definition of terms is much more than dialectical exercise in this examination. My personal files contain the records of a faculty seminar at Columbia in which, after 4 years of bi-weekly discussions of peace and war, an inventory of progress showed we had not been able to reach agreement on a definition of either "peace" or "war." The learned group was unwilling to accept Sherman's definition that "war is all hell."

Dr. Quincy Wright in his 1500 page *Study of War* defines war as "the legal condition which equally permits two or more hostile groups to carry on a conflict of armed force." Dr. Wright notes other definitions, for example, "war is a form of social behavior." This last is undoubtedly a definition by a sociologist. Also, war is a "dispute between governments carried on by violence."

Dr. Wright's field of greatest expertness is international law. His definition is legalistic. One is led to the thought that there is danger of defining war and the nature thereof, primarily in terms of one's own profession, interest or experience, perhaps to the exclusion of vital but unfamiliar aspects. I am going to avoid that possible pitfall this morning by discussing the definition of war but not defining it.

Armed Force as Characteristic of War

There is considerable agreement that war is characterized by the use of armed force. But a discussion confined to the use of armed force defines the nature of war little better than a discussion of the marriage ceremony defines the nature of marriage. Parenthetically, this analogy has possibilities for expanded discussion which we unfortunately have no time to develop.

Contribution of Concept of Cold War

Furthermore, the agreement is not complete that war is characterized by the use of armed force — witness the common and even official use of the term "cold war" — which Churchill defined as "all mischief short of war." But in this concept of cold war there is an important indication of the true nature of war. In cold war the cutting instruments of action are political, economic, psychological and the threat of overwhelming military power. These same instruments continue to be utilized when active armed force is called into the equation of a struggle between groups. The political, economic, psychological means provide the essential support for armed force in action and also continue as instruments impinging directly on the war objective. Any settlement of a war is very dependent on the threat of further active use of armed force.

War Objectives ad the Nature of War — Clausewitz

The mention of the *objective* brings me to one of the clear and non-controversial aspects of war. It has an *objective.* This readily acceptable truth makes Clausewitz' well know definition

that "war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse with an admixture of other means" still partially sound. Referring to my comment on armed force as an instrument of policy, our problem today is to mix the "other means" that we attain objectives without war. But looking at the present and into the future, this definition is not an absolute for at least two main reasons:

1. Once committed to use of armed force the original policy objective may have to be drastically adjusted to the realities of military developments — which are somewhat less predictable than in the days of Clausewitz.

2. The realities of modern war now make necessary the major shift of many national policies — policies in social, political and economic areas — which once were affected little or not at all by resort to armed force. It takes little imagination to see the jeopardy of some of our country's treasured institutions in case of war. Furthermore, armed force once unleashed now creates problems not even envisaged in the time of Clausewitz. It may unleash internal social, political and economic forces with the outcomes not very predictable.

Two Characteristics of Modern War

Closing my comment and caution on Clausewitz, who certainly comes closer than Dr. Wright because he recognizes the objective and recognizes that objective is change in the social, political and economic areas, I suggest that the nature of war now includes:

1. A likely conflict between military objectives which are means and war aims — political objectives — which are ends.

2. An unprecedented unpredictability of outcome even though the military outcome may be predictable. Using

the common expedient of quoting great men to support personal views, this is from Dr. Shotwell: "Now . . . war is as uncertain in its direction as in its intensity, or its spread. It is no longer a safe instrument for statesmanship. . . ."

Change of Modern War from Past Situations

Why this conflict between means and ends and why this unpredictability? It seems they are, to a considerable extent, new to history and are blamed on at least three factors:

1. Modern war is allied war. This situation tends to limit the freedom of action of the individual nation state.
2. Military technology and techniques now cause war to affect directly huge populations and a wide span of social, political and economic institutions.
3. There is an awareness on the part of individuals of the institutional changes in the way of life which war may generate and there is an ability of groups and leaders to take advantage of war's disturbances.

Put simply, war has in our time become, much less than formerly, a policy which can be programmed with assurance. Hence Clausewitz' definition of war used as a slogan without analysis is dangerous. Again quoting Dr. Shotwell: "In short, war which was once a directable instrument of policy has now changed its nature with the nature of modern society and ceases to be controllable and directable. . . . it becomes a contagion among the nations; and one cannot safely use a contagion as an instrument."

LESSONS FROM HISTORY

We should look to history for its lessons while continually questioning the applicability of historical precedents to our future.

I suggest two areas for particular consideration: (1) war objectives sometimes called war aims and the (2) conditions of the use of armed force described by the terms "limited war" and "unlimited war."

War Aims

You will find useful a study of war aims related to the military objectives of our country's last three years. There is an interesting possibility that the outcome of the Korean war may be closer to a realization of the initial aims than were the overwhelming victories of World Wars I and II. This is admittedly a controversial suggestion. It is made as a forerunner to the thought that the recent and current rapid elimination of physical and organizational limitations on the use of military strength now necessitate political decisions, once unnecessary, as to the extent to which armed force will be used as an instrument in war. A much wider variety of objectives than formerly is now open to the choice of leadership in case war occurs. Capabilities now exist, or may soon exist, to extinguish the opponent completely or to permit the opposing contestants to exhaust themselves completely.

The world emerged into this new situation within the last decade. The situation makes the conduct of war much more of a matter for political decision than formerly and leads to the thought that, in our system of civilian control of the military, we had better educate our controllers.

What Constitutes Destruction of Armed Force?

When military extinction of a possible opponent was practicable at an acceptable cost and the achievement of war aims followed inevitably from this extinction (as it did in our Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War) the doctrine of annihilation of enemy forces (Von Schlieffen's Cannae doctrine) as the overriding military objective could be accepted without qualms. But the term "armed force" comes to have less meaning in this context

when we realize it implies supporting arrangements back to the farm, the factory, public morale. All these elements are now feasibly subject to direct military attack and military destruction.

Military Capabilities Now Necessitate Judgements as to How Far They are Used

A country, our country, may have the capability to lock the door behind an enemy and then to bludgeon him down against it even as we destroyed Germany in World War II. But the cost may be high, it may be unpredictable, and the actual military outcome as related to postwar objectives may be less favorable than would occur with a more selective effort directed at a political solution short of complete extinction of the opposition. Put simply, military objectives in war are to move and exert military force to cause the opponent to agree to certain war aims. If those war aims extend to the destruction of the opponent's political, economic and social institutions, we have to include, under the nature of war, the business of both destroying and rebuilding those institutions as part and parcel of the war effort.

We have studied and talked little about these matters in connection with the study of war in our colleges. Communism has incorporated this destruction of old institutions and construction of new ones as part and parcel of war. We in our country should consider seriously whether we also have the same concept of war. If we do it is necessary to bring about the study and preparation of the necessary measures for use in case war comes.

Weakening of Neutrality

The historical concept of neutrality seems to be weakening if not disappearing. The nations taking a legal position of neutrality tend more and more to be "neutral against" one belligerent and to have vital interests involved in any armed conflict between other nations. In effect, the would-be neutrals have important war objectives which force them toward active participation if those objectives appear to be in peril.

Limited War and Less Limited War

Looking into history, even recent history, there were limitations on both the scope and the nature of war which were beyond the capabilities of leaders and nations to eliminate. For instance, wide-spread popular support of war is comparatively new in history except in repelling an invader.

Historically there has been a definite limitation on the proportion of manpower which could be mobilized for the war effort. Two of the main reasons were the high proportion of manpower required in the agricultural industry to provide a minimum standard of living and the lack of logistical techniques to support huge forces over a long period. The situation is now materially changed. About 12 per cent of our U. S. labor force provides our agricultural means. I need not recite the techniques and method by which we are able to support huge forces at long distances.

Destructive power in war did not increase phenomenally for a long period prior to World War I. In fact, except for one or two instances such as Sherman's march to the sea, destruction of other than military forces and installations did not change too materially over the time between Tamerlane and World War II.

The weapons and techniques of war made possible the development of a body of custom and understandings roughly paralleling diplomatic intercourse and usually called the laws of war — thereby limiting the impact of war on the individual. Following this thought for a minute, war as most of us have studied it has been practiced by western nations drawing their way of thought from what is sometimes called the Christian-Judaic-Roman tradition. Military opponents have usually possessed common denominators in political and economic philosophy and particularly in the value placed on the individual and hence on human life.

I think everyone here will accept the enormous change of the last decade without listing any other of the many characteristics of war in the past. Technology has recently multiplied the powers of physical destruction which existed in the past. The multiplier action apparently continues in the foreseeable future. Techniques have multiplied the power of social, economic and political change. The Asiatic with his disregard for the individual and entirely different concepts of law, order, good and evil is becoming a major factor of war.

Our capability for mobilization and mobility have steadily accelerated since Napoleon first demonstrated that a modern nation's manpower could be mobilized for all but support of an external war effort. The Germans perfected a system for readying military manpower for instant use in case of war. Railroads and the Industrial Revolution made possible the movement and support of proportionately greatly increased armed forces. Technology makes possible the application of armed force of a great nation anywhere on the globe. Military objectives can now be comparatively unlimited.

The Historical Change in the War Machine

To make war there must be what is often called a war machine in the possession of each contestant. I mention only two aspects of many concerning this machine: (1) the time factor and (2) the trend of the war machine toward incorporating the entire nation into its components.

Change Related to Timing

The lead time of military preparation for either attack or defense has been steadily increasing. Today, as everybody here knows, years are required to progress from a low to a high level of preparedness. Furthermore the rapid change in military equipment and techniques requires continual concentrated effort rather than the intermittent efforts familiar in the history of only the recent past.

In contrast to the long time to get ready there has been a steady decrease in the time when military force might conceivably achieve its military objective if applied by one nation against another. Some people now writing for the public press hint that the time is not far off when our own great country, unless vast and costly defense arrangements are put in hand, could be reduced to paralysis in a few hours campaign.

There seems no reason to believe that these trends related to the time factor will not continue. Hence the nature of modern war places emphasis on readiness which perhaps becomes the basic principle of our strategy of security.

Change Due to Incorporation of all Elements of National Life in War Nations

Military power not long ago was a thing considered as apart from the U. S. national life and from the national way of life of most nations. Now it is analogous to an iceberg of which I believe only the top 1/7th is visible. That top 1/7th corresponds to our combatant forces. These are dependent for existence and effectiveness on economic and political arrangements, on public support, on civilian activities such as civilian defense, and, in short, on the integrated effort of the entire nation which is analogous to the unseen portion of the iceberg. I stress this point because most of the public and some professionals are fascinated by the top 1/7th of the iceberg and are short on realization concerning the other 6/7ths. Mahan, by the way, in bringing the importance of seapower, particularly blockade, forcefully to the attention of political leaders, was giving an elementary course in the importance of the lower 6/7ths of the iceberg. Parenthetically, the necessities of the proper organization and arrangement of this 6/7ths do conflict at times with the realities of one of our most treasured institutions — the tripartite form of federal democracy. This we must realize and to this we must accustom our so-called "military minds."

I have labored, perhaps overlong, this emphasis on the rapid evolution of the past two decades in may aspects of the nature of war and the accelerating change probably going forward in the future. There is a reason for the emphasis. Precepts produced from observation of situations in preceding generations may often be inapplicable to the current situation and should be questioned. So much for my bow to the importance of history.

ELEMENTS OF MODERN WAR

Under the heading of elements of modern war we can, I think, only outline some useful methods of analysis this morning. I suggest two ways to define the elements of modern war: (1) in terms of time, and (2) in terms of policy areas.

Elements Described in Terms of Time

As to the definition in terms of time, there are obviously three distinct phases: (1) the prior preparedness period, (2) the period of hostilities, and (3) the period of pay-off, of rehabilitation and of consummation of war objectives. This definition may seem too simple for a mature audience. But note that America, twice in this century, failed to comprehend the importance of the pay-off period or the applicability of military power thereto. You might spend an hour sometime discussing the costly problems remaining, assuming the demise through war of the military power now controlled by the Kremlin. As to the 2nd time period, that of hostilities, it seems, from our U. S. standpoint, that we must think of it in three sub-periods (a) a period of considerable damage to ourselves and of material defensive operations, (b) a period of stabilization and (c) the period of victory. Unless an enemy grossly underestimates our capabilities he would not choose war except under circumstances forcing on us some such progression as I outline. It is the last period, the period of victory, which determines the pay-off and demands great political wisdom. That period started in July 1944 in the European side of World War II. In hindsight, which is always full of smug wisdom, we may have bungled it.

Definition of Elements in Terms of Policy Areas

One other definition of the elements of war is to list them as political, economic, social-psychological, and military. As I mentioned earlier, each factor is an instrument for direct use against the enemy; also the first three listed are the pillars supporting the military. This support is mutual. For instance, political pressures on neutrals and on the enemy are of little value without military successes. Even economic warfare, as those here well know, has a diminishing effectiveness unless military blockade supports paper blockade techniques. The people's will to suffer and work is closely related to military action — and oddly enough may be inverse to military successes. Such was England and Germany's production record and also — to some extent — our own in World War II.

Analysis of Military Policy Areas in War

The military policy area breaks clearly into sub-areas. Those are not, in my opinion, seapower, landpower and airpower. Such a breakdown may still continue to be useful for organizational, budgetary and recruiting purposes and the hazards and controversies of change undoubtedly argue for retention of the concept. But there is a more suitable breakdown into sub-areas for the purpose of highlighting the existence and importance of the lower 6/7ths of the iceberg of military power I mentioned previously. I suggest that the realities of the current struggle for the world combined with modern strictly military matters show four military elements to war:

1. Mobilization and defense of the home base.
2. Arrangements with allies. These materially influence military strategy.
3. The line of communications for support of allies and ourselves.
4. The actual application of military power against the enemy.

Each of these elements is a proper subject for a book. But note the effect of various policy choices under any one of the headings. Without a mobilization base our prospects are only for defensive war plus some retaliatory action. Without allies we have a much lessened need for an L of C and perhaps no remunerative place to use some of our current military capabilities. Without defense of the U. S. we will soon have, for the first time in our history, a danger of quick military extinction. This possibility when recognized by friends and enemies, increases the effectiveness of the enemy's cold war measures directed at the in-between world of friends and neutrals. Unreadiness is paradoxically one of the ways to prevent or delay modern war since a government may choose the way of a modern "Munich" rather than the enormous destruction of modern war.

Elements of War Vary for Different Nations

Parenthetically, the elements of war are certainly different for different states and at different times. Thus Clausewitz and the Germans who studied war from 1815-1914 thought in terms of landpower, limited war aims clearly related to military strategy, and the deliberate adoption of war as an instrument of policy. Some countries, in the past, and perhaps even now, must think of war as primarily a defensive operation and perhaps even of the certainty of invasion. Their major elements of war include the underground resistance and the measures to preserve vital institutions and the national entity under the smothering blanket of enemy military power. Since we are engaged in an allied effort we have to comprehend our allies' viewpoint as well as defining our own.

EFFECT OF WAR ON MODERN SOCIETY

In considering modern society and modern war we must, I think, consider both societies of individuals and the world society of some 80 nation-states which have relations with each other as sovereign entities. The effects of the nature of war on

both the society of human beings and the society of nations have shifted greatly over the last 40 years.

Effect on Society of Individuals

Wars have been the kick-off for many major political, economic and social changes. In retrospect some have perhaps been desirable. But the present and the future have major differences from pre-World War I.

1. In 1914, and even for some peoples as late as 1939, populations went to war with enthusiasm. Except perhaps in Oriental countries, and this exception is worth noting, recent attitudes are those stemming from a grim realization of the probable cost.

2. Major war is now almost certain to change a society materially — even with victory; witness the change in Britain. Defeat may bring extinction.

3. Readiness now being an essential, the peacetime way of life is changed by such measures as conscription, huge military procurement with its impact on economy, civilian defense, high taxation, etc. To emphasize this point consider that the standard 12 months European conscription of pre-World War II is now 18 months to two years; the 5.9% of national product then devoted to armaments has now risen to about 10 percent for our NATO allies.

   In our country the people have become uneasily conscious of military matters. We are, for instance, moving toward a situation where a large proportion of able-bodied manpower between 19 and 30 is either in the active service or subject to call from the reserves.

5. There have been some instances, but not enough, of restraint in group conflicts, e.g., labor management

in Britain, to the end that the nation may be strengthened against war. This voluntary restraint may increase.

6. The consciousness of the great destructive power of modern war has generated a great deal of individual and group activity toward war prevention, e.g., public interest and pressures in negotiated settlements, in regulation of armaments, and in international collaboration for the settlement of disputes. This consciousness has also produced the neutralism and "head-in-the-sand" approach of some Europeans.

7. Specifically turning to the U. S., we have become a very military (not warlike) people. This has occurred so rapidly that much of our current leadership in public office, school, church and community is, and will remain, unprepared to grapple with the realities forced on us by the nature of our national security situation. Typical are the views of two senior individuals I respect greatly. One now asks me, at each of our meetings, why we can't just tell all the other nations in the world to go to hell! — except he wants to annex Mexico. The other inquires whether it wouldn't be economical and sound to give up all interest in the rimland of Asia.

Effect of Modern War on Society of Nations

The effect of modern war on the society of nations is as marked as the effect on individuals. We are all familiar enough with history to know that World War I occasioned the addition of a large number of nation-states to that society; World War II resulted in the disappearance or the curtailment of sovereignty of many, and the rapid decline of colonial imperialism with the accompanying emergence of many Asiatic states. World War II also brought to the world what has been called "bipolarity." It

seems that Communism combined with the nature of modern war now make unlikely the reestablishment of any multiple balance of power system in the world.

Some of the specific effects of modern war on nations are:

1. No small nation, or group of small nations, can now stand alone.
2. Neutrality becomes difficult, and, for some nations, impossible.
3. Military force, once unleashed, overflows huge areas because of its speed, range and destructive power. Barriers of mountains, seas, deserts and rivers have much less military — hence political — meaning.
4. Modern arms are too costly for many nations and can be manufactured, in all needed types, by only a few.
5. Alliances are now a necessary element of international relationships.

There is a general and genuine urge toward collaboration to prevent war — because war is so feared. Most of the world's nations will cling to the UN, if only because it is a tangible reed to lean on — and a weak reed is better than none. It is an interesting truth that the great unifying force in the world since World War II has been a fear of modern war. Part of this fear is fear of the unknown and is due to inability to appraise politico-military developments in case major war occurs. This obscurity may help for a long while in our deterent strategy against Soviet communism. For there is a question that the men in the Kremlin are gamblers. They may be willing to pay a great price for the world but they are likely to want to be certain that favorable results are achieved. There is no sense in definition by the U. S. of an equation which enables them to figure the cost of successful use of war, either limited or total, as an instrument of policy — unless we are very certain that their figuring will always show the cost prohibitive.

NATURE OF WAR AND U. S. STRATEGY OF SECURITY

It is worthy to note that our country has never before, in times of peace, faced a world situation in which our military planners had any useful guides to the likely nature — other than battle tactics — of war if it came. And we did not foresee the nature of the Korean War even though, in hindsight, the probability should have been clear.

There is no point in emphasizing to this group the changes and complications forced on our country's security policy by the recent changes in the nature of modern war. We have come to share a responsibility, in our enlightened self-interest, for the security of places which most Americans cannot find on the map.

The requirement for readiness faces our country with a need for a continuing high level of preparedness and a see-through constancy of public and Congressional support which is unprecedented. This is perhaps the major problem.

The advance of military capabilities for destruction may soon make "keeping ahead of the Russians" in military technology much less meaningful. Twice total destruction, if opposed by total destruction, still does not give security. Knowledge of the existence of enormous destructive power may produce a world outwardly calm. But it will still be a very dangerous world with a stability very dependent on a combination of military readiness and political wisdom.

Alliances are troublesome methods of making war and even more troublesome methods of deterring aggression. But we have, I believe, no other recourse than to accept the truth of the ditty chanted at the Gridiron Club dinner in 1949:

> "The old North Atlantic has spread quite a lot
> To Italy from Maine.
> There'll soon be no country that touches it not
> With the single exception of Spain.

They call me a schemer; well maybe I am,
But today I can follow the shore
Of our North Atlantic, all the way to Siam."

The strength and cooperation of these alliances is bound to fluctuate. But it seems only prudent to preserve our forward strategy of security "all the way to Siam" until the obscurities of the future unfold. By preserving that forward strategy we retain the maximum number of possible alternatives from which to choose in case the prophesies of some of our more atomic-minded commentators come true.

I have stressed several times the importance of the economic aspect of modern war. Any rough calculation of the cost of World War III is likely to price out at around a trillion dollars without taking account of destruction due to attack on the U. S. — which might be a third or more of our industrial production. This order of cost, combined with casualties, would be very likely to mean a drastic change in our U. S. economic institutions — another aspect of modern war. Obviously this probable cost is a yardstick against which to measure how much we can afford to pay to avoid war.

In closing let's turn our thoughts for a moment to the military aspects of modern war. As to the principles which should guide us I can do no better than hope you all have read Admiral Conolly's article on *The Principles of War*. Certainly my thoughts can add nothing to that analysis. As I understand Admiral Conolly, he agrees with Napoleon's maxim that "Nothing is absolute in war."

As to the way of military strategy and of battle, if war comes, I suggest we have to be prepared for developments across a wide spectrum of possibilities — some of them distasteful to those of us in uniform — from "phoney war" to thermonuclear war. There is danger that we base our readiness on some assumption which will be proven false by some technological change or political action.

But our hope and objective is to act that military force is a successful deterrent and is, in itself, an adequate instrument of policy without our being forced to accept war. The matter we have in our welter of public discussion, or perhaps even in our classified papers, includes certain basic questions:

a. Taking into account that we have the twin objectives, not always compatible, of keeping the in-between world from being nibbled by communism, and of deterring war, what is the best deterrent national security program?

b. Is this best deterrent program the same as the best program for military victory if war occurs?

c. How, if the nature of war now makes it too dangerous for use as an instrument of statesmanship (and I think it is rapidly becoming so — if not so now) do we design the formula for safe slacking off of the arms race?

I leave my subject with these three questions and with a thought borrowed from a line of Yeats and a line of Clausewitz.

> In this world ridden by the dragons of communism and atomic explosives, military strategy may seem simple; but if you look again you will not find it very easy.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Colonel G. A. Lincoln, USA

Colonel George A. Lincoln, USA, was graduated from the U. S. Military Academy in 1929. He was a Rhodes Scholar from the state of New York and received both B.A. and M.A. degrees from Oxford in 1932.

During World War II he rose to the rank of Brigadier General, having served in the European Theater, 1942-43, and on the War Department General Staff from 1943-47. He participated also in war-time international conferences and was the War Department member of the Joint and Combined Staff Planners from 1944-47. At the Paris Conference in 1946, Colonel Lincoln served as Military Advisor to the Secretary of State. In 1948-49 he was Deputy to the Under Secretary of the Army. Colonel Lincoln was Defense Department representative for the drafting of the Mutual Security Program; Defense Advisor to the U. S. Representative, Temporary Council Committee of NATO; and a member of the U. S. Delegation to Rome and Lisbon. Since 1947 he has been made permanent Professor of Social Sciences at the U. S. Military Academy.

He has served as lecturer at the Army, Air, and National War Colleges. He is co-author of "Background for our War," 1942, and "Economics of National Security," 1950, and author of "International Realities," 1948.